

AUTHORITY TO DETAIN

• DETAINEE MISSION IAW UNSCR 1546:

- - GRANTS MNF-I THE AUTHORITY TO USE ALL MEANS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF IRAQ AT THE INVITATION OF ITS INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
- - FULL RANGE OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND AUTHORITIES LAID OUT IN THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION APPLY TO MNF-I.
- - CONTINUING ABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT DETAINEE OPERATIONS IAW THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION.

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DETAINEE OPERATIONS MISSION AUTHORITIES ...

- SAFEGUARDING AND SECURING ALL PROTECTED PERSONS UNDER THE 3RD AND 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION IN CUSTODY IN THE MNF-I DETENTION CENTERS AND PROTECTED AREAS.
- OPERATION AND FOCUS OF THE MNF-I JOINT INTERROGATION & DEBRIEFING CENTER, PROVIDE HIGH QUALITY ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE TO THE WARFIGHTERS.
- STREAMLINING THE MNF-I DUE PROCESS SYSTEM AND REFERRAL SYSTEM OF SECURITY INTERNEES AND DETAINEES TO THE IRAQI LEGAL SYSTEM.
- CONDUCT OF MNF-I OPERATIONS TO PROTECT THE MeK PERSONNEL AT CAMP ASHRAF AND LEAD THE EFFORT TO COORDINATE A FINAL DISPOSITION SOLUTION OF THESE PERSONS WITH THE ITG, INTERAGENCY GROUPS, AND NGO REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS.
- INTEGRATE IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP IN ALL FACETS OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS.

... DOD'S SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT WITH THE
ITG FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS.

54

SECRET-REF-MCPT

Unreadable Text

PROCESS FOR RELEASE

- **COMBINED REVIEW AND RELEASE BOARD (CRRB)**
 - 9 MEMBERS (6 x IRAQI'S — MOJ, MOL, MOHR and 3 x MNF-I — MP, MI, SJA)
 - EVERY 180 DAYS, 3 TIMES A WEEK — AVERAGING ABOUT ONCE EVERY 120 DAYS
 - RELEASE, RELEASE WITH GUARANTOR, RETAIN AS SECURITY RISK
 - LIST OF DETAINEES PUBLISHED TEN DAYS IN ADVANCE
 - COMMANDERS MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INPUT (NORMALLY DO NOT RELEASE BUT NOT ALWAYS — NEED DETAILS)
 - BOARD RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED TO THE RELEASE / RETAIN AUTHORITY
 - DCG-DO — INDIVIDUAL CASE REVIEW FOR ALL MSC "DO NOT RELEASE" INPUT REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 78
 - RECIDIVISM RATE = 1+%
 - MI HOLD KEEPS DETAINEE FILE FROM THE CRRB

57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT OF IRAQ (CCCI)

- INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE FOCUSES ON INSURGENT CELLS
- TRIALS CONDUCTED: 140
- DEFENDANTS (MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS FOR SOME TRIALS): 250
- INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS PENDING: 50
 - HEARINGS HAVE INCREASED FROM 5 PER WEEK IN JUL 04 TO 10 PER WEEK IN JAN 05
- SENTENCING RANGE (FOR ALL OFFENSES): 6 MOS — 30 YEARS
- AVERAGE SENTENCE: 2.57 YEARS
- OFFENSES INCLUDE:
 - PASSPORT VIOLATIONS
 - WILLFUL DESTRUCTION OF A BUILDING
 - KIDNAPPING
 - EXPLOSIVES
 - ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVT
 - INCITING AN ARMED REBELLION
 - ATTACKS ON THE PUBLIC
 - MANUFACTURING
 - MURDER
- TREND: PROSECUTION OF HIGHER LEVEL INSURGENT LEADERSHIP

58

~~SECRET RELEIGHT~~

WHAT TO WATCH

- **AUTHORITY TO SEGREGATE FOR INTERROGATION**
 - 7 DAYS COLONEL
 - 14 DAYS GENERAL OFFICER CAN SIGN WAIVER TO COLONEL
 - 30 DAYS GENERAL OFFICER
- **TRAINING**
 - CERTIFY INTERROGATORS
 - UNCERTIFIED CAN USE DIRECT APPROACH
 - CERTIFY GUARDS
 - USE A GUARDMOUNT TO REINFORCE TRAINING AND ROE
- **EVIDENCE / TRIAL**
 - NEED TO DEDICATE AN INVESTIGATOR ON OBJECTIVE
 - THIS NEEDS TO BE COMMANDER'S BUSINESS

INTERNAL ASSESSMENT VISITS

SCHEDULE


42 ID	1-7 MAR 05
Tikrit	1 Mar
Remagan	1 Mar
Kirkuk	7 Mar
11 ACR (Mosul)	14 MAR 05
3 ID	18-26 MAR 05
Liberty	18 Mar
Rustamiyah	21 Mar
Union	26 Mar
3-1 AD (Taji)	26 MAR 05
II MEF	22 MAR - 4 APR
05	
Kalsu	22 Mar
Duke	23 Mar
Ramadi	25 Mar
Al Asad	1 Apr
Al Qaim	2 Apr
Fallujah	4 Apr

DETENTION OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

17 Feb 2006

~~SECRET REL TO USA, MNFI~~

LOCATIONS OF THEATER FACILITIES...



CURRENT NUMBERS...

TOTAL IN THEATER FACILITIES - 14,769

FT SUSE - 1299


ABU GHRAIB - 4767

CAMP CROPPER - 126 (HVC/HVD)


CAMP BUCCA - 8197

IN DIVISION FACILITIES - 438

DETAINEE LIFE CYCLE...



NEXT FEW YEARS...



OTHER TOPICS...

- MOST DETAINEES ARE HELD BASED ON INTEL ...
OUT OF 14,600 DETAINEES, ABOUT 2000 WILL GO TO COURT AND PRISON. THE REMAINDER WILL EVENTUALLY BE RELEASED.
- REINTEGRATION PROGRAM BEING DEVELOPED TO DETER REJOINING THE INSURGENCY.
- COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT ONGOING INSIDE COMPOUNDS TO DETER EXTREMIST OPERATIONS.
- JIDC DESIGNED/ORGANIZED TO SUPPORT DIVISION EFFORT.
- RELEASES CONDUCTED 2-3 TIMES A MONTH.

HOW TO BUILD A COURT CASE...

- INCLUDE PICTURES THAT LINK THE DETAINEE TO THE EVENT
- IDENTIFY TWO EYEWITNESSES TO THE OFFENSE WHO CAN TESTIFY IN PERSON OR OVER VTC
- DIAGRAM/SKETCH OF SITE AND RELATIONSHIP TO EVENT
- FOR WEAPONS CACHES, DEMONSTRATING OWNERSHIP OF SITE, CAR ... NOT COMMON AREA
- DESCRIBE INJURIES TO COALITION FORCES (MED REPORT, DEATH CERTIFICATE...)

Pages 11 through 12 redacted for the following reasons:

1.4b, 1.4d

Approved for Release

IRAQ POLICE PROGRAM: PROPOSED REALLOCATION \$800M FY 2004 IRRF

■ Adnan Justice Training Center	198.5M (80.74M)
○ Container camp for 700	
○ Specialized Training and Institutional Development	
■ Police Centric Expenditures	
■ Drug Enforcement	3,347,440
■ Intelligence	5,278,883
■ Iraq fingerprint system	4,500,000
■ Counter-Terrorism Unit-- (2 Bat + Specialized Units + Intel	64,000,000
■ Counter-Terrorism Training	18,078,606
■ Post blast investigation	1,250,000
■ Internal Controls	3,000,000
■ Organized Crime	10,055,094
■ Management Development	3,000,000
■ Basic Criminal Investigation	5,000,000
■ Police recruitment techniques	200,000
■ O&M for 6-months	25.0M
○ Baghdad hotels (2) / Lodging/food/security	
■ Jordan training facility	125.0M
■ CPA-PSD Agreements	94.0M
○ Logistical Support @ \$89M/yr - PSD Security @ \$5M/yr	
■ 500 IPA (CIVPOL) for 1-year	235.0M
○ Vehicles/maintenance/communications/computers	
○ Personal equipment/weapons/security/logistics/transport	
○ Hotels/palaces in Mosul & Basra	
■ Jordan basic trainers for 1-year	45.0M
○ 160 US trainers / Support for all trainers	
○ Complete Jawa construction	
■ Iraq basic trainers (US) for 1-year	71.5M
○ Baghdad - 125 trainers / Irbil - 75 trainers	
○ 200 interpreters / security / logistics / transport	
■ Administrative cost allocation (INL)	6.0M
■ Total: Year 1	800.0M

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no-file
18 Feb 04

**DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON IRAQ (U)**

OPTIONS FOR AN IRAQI CARETAKER GOVERNMENT (S)

We must weigh several factors when considering the different options for establishing a "caretaker government" in Iraq by June 30, 2004. Such a "caretaker government" would establish an executive with a limited mandate of administering the Iraqi state, while preparing for the elections in late 2004/early 2005 of a single legislative body that would serve both as the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and Constitutional Convention. Whatever its specific form, a "caretaker government" would need to strike a balance between having limited powers and, at the same time, being viewed as legitimate and competent to administer the country in the July 2004 - January 2005 period. This government would also need to be seen as opening a new chapter in Iraqi history. In assessing the merits of any option, there are several criteria that should be used:

- We need a capable interim Iraqi executive authority that can provide reasonably efficient governance and contribute to security for Iraqis, and work well with its international security and reconstruction partners.
- We should look for a model that maximizes legitimacy and acceptance by Iraqis above all, but also internationally.
- We seek a model that represents Iraq's diversity and therefore would enhance chances for acceptance. However, we should aim to minimize extremism and contain the potential forces of fragmentation within Iraqi society.
- We should avoid confrontation with Sistani on this subject. (S)

A. The Existing Iraqi Governing Council (C)

The model that could be most quickly realized would transform the existing IGC into the interim Iraqi executive authority. This could be accomplished by having the IGC or the UN select an interim Prime Minister from the group. Restrictions could be placed on this Prime Minister, such as a term limit or prohibition (voluntary or compelled) from running for elected office under the new constitution. The remaining 24 members could form a quasi-executive body, empowered to participate in the review of key policy decisions, make budget decisions, and retain and expand authority over the ministries. The existing Ministers would continue to serve at the pleasure of the IGC or until a permanent government is elected. (S)

This option relies upon an extant institution and does not involve any complex logistics. The timing of a final decision for this option would thus be shaped more by political factors, and could conceivably be delayed until as late as May 2004. (S)

Pros:

- Most simple and straightforward and least likely to be seen as dramatic change in course.
- Members of the IGC represent Iraq's ethnic and religious mosaic, with many of them hailing from the best organized political parties. Having been promoted as the representative face of the Iraqi people, the IGC has achieved recognition in a number of international forums.

~~SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(d)
Declassify on: 2/18/14

~~SECRET/NO DIS/NO FORN~~

2

- Given their status in the new system, the members of the IGC would most likely not object to -- or interfere with the implementation of -- this option.
- Sistani might agree to this as a temporary measure, to ensure continuation of a Shia majority in the key governing institution until elections are held. (S)

Cons:

- Despite having made some headway, the IGC remains largely ineffective and splintered. Though accepted as an "Iraqi face" to the CPA, it is not widely regarded by Iraqis as a legitimate, independent or representative governing body.
- Unlikely to be popular with most Iraqis. Acceptance would increase if Sistani moves from passive acceptance to vocal endorsement, which is unlikely. Maintenance of the IGC would exacerbate further Sunni resentment at being shut out of new political process, and could invigorate the insurgency.
- Existing IGC has a strong Islamist contingent (~25%), which would continue unchanged.
- The quality of the IGC members varies considerably and no natural "Washington" or even "Karzai" has emerged. It may be incapable of agreeing on or accepting a single "Prime Minister" or effectively governing. (S)

B. An Expanded and Restructured IGC (C)

In an endeavor that could be managed by Brahimi and the UN, the second model would build upon the existing IGC, but expand and broaden it. Representatives from other major stakeholders such as key tribes, unions, and professional/technocratic organizations could be included. The newly-formed interim council could then select a Prime Minister to serve as head of a new interim Iraqi executive authority. The same sorts of limitations on the tenure of the Prime Minister as in Option A could be adopted. Current Ministers could continue to serve and be accountable to the Prime Minister. (S)

Determining specifically how to expand the IGC would inevitably involve complex political bargaining, and would be time consuming. Depending upon the scale and scope of the expansion, two months or more may be necessary to complete the process. A decision to pursue this option would need to be made no later than late March 2004. (S)

Pros:

- This model would build on the existing IGC with its experience and recognition, and add additional members to provide a larger, more representative body that might have more legitimacy with the Iraqi public. Could be structured to balance shortcomings of current IGC, including increasing representation of Sunnis, Kurds not affiliated with the KDP or PUK, and other Iraqis with more technocratic experience, while diluting influence of Islamists.
- This approach might find support among the majority of the members of the existing IGC (but not all).
- Expanding Iraqi involvement would create space for potential new leaders to emerge in the public eye. (S)

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~~SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN~~

3

Cons:

- Maintaining the IGC as the base for a new governing body would likely give existing IGC members a leg up on new members and would raise questions about how existing IGC structures would operate (e.g., Would the 9-member Presidency Council dissolve or be replaced? Would existing IGC committees be restructured?).
- Some current IGC members may resist this option as diluting their power and prestige. (S)

C. Caretaker Government Selected by National Conference (C)

A "National Conference" or Shura involving a few hundred delegates could be convened to elect the caretaker executive which could include a broad spectrum of Iraqi society, including technocrats, political parties, tribal notables, religious figures, etc. IGC members, ministers, and governors could be automatic members. Other participants -- technocrats, provincial representatives, key tribal and Sunni leaders, etc. -- would be invited possibly by the UN, from the provinces. This body would then select a Prime Minister and Cabinet. (S)

Organizing a National Conference/Shura and having it select a government is the most complex and time consuming option. Three months is an optimistic estimate of the time needed to complete this task. Therefore, a decision to pursue this option would need to be made as soon as possible, and no later than mid-March 2004. (S)

Pros:

- The Shura could be constructed to balance shortcomings of current IGC, including increasing representation of Sunnis, Kurds not affiliated with the KDP or PUK, and other Iraqis with more technocratic experience, while diluting the influence of Islamists.
- Expanding Iraqi involvement would create space for potential new leaders to emerge in the public eye.
- Many Iraqis might welcome a National Conference/Shura as a more transparent step toward democracy. (S)

Cons:

- The process would be cumbersome and open to public criticism even if the UN were to take a large role in implementing it.
- Some current IGC members may resist this option as diluting their power and prestige.
- Doubtful whether Sistani would support creation of such a Shura without guarantees, including regarding its composition (i.e., Shia majority). (S)

D. Technocratic Government Selected by Roundtable Meeting (C)

A "roundtable" meeting involving 30-50 Iraqis could be convened, probably under UN auspices, to choose an interim executive composed of technocrats and provincial representatives. The existing IGC would be dissolved under this option. (S)

Although not as complex an undertaking as organizing a National Conference/Shura, convening such a "roundtable" would be a logistical and political challenge involving at least

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~~SECRET/NODIS/NOFORN~~

4

two months to complete. A decision to pursue this option would need to be made no later than late March 2004. ~~(S)~~

Pros:

- Some local and provincial election results suggest Iraqi preference for seemingly apolitical technocrats over representatives of established political parties or sectarian organizations.
- Option most likely to produce an executive that focuses upon tasks of administration and day-to-day governance.
- Emphasis on technocratic competence could dilute influence of extremists. ~~(S)~~

Cons:

- Unlikely to secure broad popular political support in Iraq even for limited period, especially without vocal backing of major figures such as Sistani. Current IGC and other prominent Iraqi political figures likely to resist any option that likely would exclude them from the interim government.
- The process would be cumbersome and open to public criticism even if the UN were to take a large role in implementing it. ~~(S)~~

Possible Role for UN ~~(C)~~

The role of the UN would be critical in helping define a process for selecting a caretaker government that is viewed as legitimate by a wide spectrum of Iraqis. Ideally, the UN would take the public lead in this process, and would sustain some presence inside Iraq to bring the Iraqis on board during the period before the transfer of sovereignty. The UN could also take the public lead in designing and implementing the selection process for a National Conference or roundtable, if we decided to pursue that option. The UN -- and Iraqis -- should play the public lead role of organizing and running the event. ~~(S)~~

Once a "caretaker government" is formed, if the UN were willing, it could extend its role in Iraq similar to what it has done elsewhere:

- It might be necessary or useful for the UN to take on a High Representative role in order to safeguard any agreement on the executive, as well as to pave the way for later national elections to be held on schedule. As was the case in Bosnia, the High Representative could operate by agreement of the legitimate Iraqi authority to allow the UN to implement governing authorities not given to the interim government with its limited powers or to serve as a check on its powers (e.g., reviewing certain categories of legislation before they can become law).
- A new UNSCR could be a persuasive device to legitimize the establishment of the caretaker government, and at the same time to guarantee international "checks" to ensure the six-month tenure of the government and limits on its powers. ~~(S)~~

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XXXXXXXXXXXX (classification to be determined)
PROG: 04/11/04
DRAFTED: YLEMPERT
AUTHORIZED: LPBREMER
CLEARED: RDBLACKWILL

XO-File
①

NODIS

CPA BAGHDAD
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

E.O.: 12958: DECL: 04/11/14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, PINS
SUBJECT: BLACKWILL-BRAHIMI CONSULTATION - APRIL 11

CLASSIFIED BY CPA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (b)(6) FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)

1. ~~(c)~~ SUMMARY: Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill met with United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi on the morning of April 11, in one of a planned series of daily morning meetings. Brahimi stressed that under the current circumstances, when the "political process is in danger of becoming irrelevant, because there is a war going on," the U.S. must consider taking radical and dramatic action on the political front that clearly signals to Iraqis a shift from business as usual. He advocated a wholesale change in both the Governing Council and current Ministers. After being pressed by Blackwill, Brahimi agreed to give a public statement detailing the UN's vision of the political path forward prior to his departure from Baghdad. He said he would give the statement either the evening of April 13 or the morning of April 14, and that he would discuss it with Blackwill prior to making it public so that there are "no surprises". He rejected the idea of staying longer in Iraq on this visit. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(s)~~ During the meeting, Brahimi stressed that, "the situation has deteriorated all over Iraq. My team is starting to consider ideas, and foremost among them is the need for national reconciliation, so that Iraqis begin thinking of themselves as part of one country rather than caring solely about their specific region. Relations also

need to be mended between the Americans and the Iraqis. The U.S. will be here for a long time. If you want to be here as a friend, not as a hated and resented occupier, you need to do some creative thinking and take some significant measures now." Brahimi continued, "the U.S. must determine how to create relationships with the wider Iraqi population, not just with a few Iraqis who came with you from Washington. This is critical. If you don't act soon, you will find yourself in a war with the people of Iraq."

3. ~~(S)~~ Brahimi counseled that "by April 13 we hope to have a few ideas of where to go. But, the political process that the UN is engaged in is in danger of becoming irrelevant. A war is taking place now. Most of the Iraqis I have met want only to talk about the war. The UN-led political process must be seen by Iraqis as directly addressing the current crisis and providing an alternative to violence. But the United Nations cannot do this alone. The UN cannot be seen as covering up the war that is ongoing. The key is that the imagination of Iraqis must be hit squarely with a dramatically new U.S. approach to governance in Iraq - it cannot be business as usual, going through incremental motions of pretending." Blackwill, asked, "so your recommendation is a radical departure that is publicly seen and understood by Iraqis writ large as a sign that we have fundamentally changed our approach? You think that we need wholesale reform in terms of getting rid of most IGC members and most Ministers?" Brahimi responded, "absolutely."

4. ~~(S)~~ Brahimi continued, "Iraqis across the board tell us they do not like the Governing Council and Ministers". Blackwill replied that while some groups in Iraq are coalescing against the Coalition, the IGC, despite its flaws, is standing for law and order. He highlighted that we may not want to lose Shi'a players such as SCIRI's Abdul Aziz al Hakim or Da'wa's Ibrahim Jaafari, not least because we do not want their militias to join the fight against the Coalition. Brahimi responded that the Coalition must be careful "not to serve the agenda of Hakim and Jaafari by clearing out the Al Mahdi Army, and leaving their militias in place. All militias must be disarmed simultaneously." Blackwill stressed that we want to dismantle all the militias but that it is extremely complex, and will take some time.

5. ~~(S)~~ Blackwill urged Brahimi that prior to his departure, he hold a press conference detailing his specific plan for the political way forward. Noting Washington's keen interest, he emphasized that presenting a roadmap is critical in order to offer an alternative to the continuing violence. Brahimi agreed that he would make such a statement and emphasized that, "I don't like surprises, and I don't like to surprise other people either, so I'll discuss my plan with you beforehand. You may not like everything in it, but I hope you will like most of it. But unless all of us undertake many complementary initiatives, there will not be a political process in Iraq; there will only be a war." Brahimi noted that he might give the statement in New York. Blackwill strongly disagreed and urged him to issue it from Baghdad. Otherwise, the media would trumpet that the Brahimi mission had failed. Brahimi seemed to agree. Due to Brahimi's tentative travel plans, his remarks could be given on either the evening of April 13, or the morning of April 14. Blackwill inquired if Brahimi would consider extending his current trip in Iraq, to which Brahimi replied, "not a chance."

6. ~~(S)~~ Brahimi noted that the USG must find a way to get Ayatollah Sistani, "firmly on your side and bought into your strategy." He urged that the CPA find "good, reliable messengers" to Sistani, and stated, "I can help with that." Brahimi recommended that Sistani be "put to the test" by the USG presenting him with ideas for how to move towards a peaceful Iraq "with a clean government", and asking if he supports this.

7. ~~(S)~~ Brahimi urged that U.S. strategy not be to take "one action after another", but rather to embark upon several parallel and complementary processes. A bold and integrated U.S. policy was required. He particularly emphasized that the U.S. adopt a much more sophisticated plan regarding Fallujah. He stressed, "do not say to the Fallujans, 'you've been bad boys, so you got what you deserved; now be good boys and you will get economic assistance. Rather, you must clearly state, 'there have been mistakes made on both sides. Let us move forward.'" He said the U.S. should consider a major speech by the President soon, in which the President could declare, "what happened in Fallujah is horrible. Another Fallujah must not happen again."

8. (§) Brahimi, who had traveled to Mosul on April 10, briefed Blackwill on his "extremely good" consultations there. Commenting that he met with several "outstanding intellectuals", he said that Iraqis in Mosul complained that Mosul has been "totally neglected" in terms of national level politics. [Note: There is no one from the municipality of Mosul on the Iraqi Governing Council. End note]. The Moslawis also complained that (1) basic medical supplies are not available, and that it is therefore difficult for hospitals in the city to perform surgical procedures, and (2) the Health Minister (an Islamic Da'wa Party appointee) is incompetent, has turned his ministry into a "Da'wa Party ghetto", and is letting Iraq's health system deteriorate. Brahimi noted that a constant theme in his consultations is the poor quality of many of Iraq's current Ministers, major problems in ministries with party patronage and corruption, and that many Iraqis have asserted that there is little difference between how the ministries operate now, and how they conducted business under Saddam. Brahimi opined that most of the Ministers should be replaced.

9. (§) Comment: Throughout the conversation, Brahimi's comments were offered in a friendly and sympathetic spirit. He is genuinely and profoundly worried that Iraq is about to fall apart, with all the obvious consequences for this country, the region, and the United States. In that context, he said he was up all night thinking about his mission and the deteriorating situation here. Ambassadors Bremer and Blackwill will meet with Brahimi the evening of April 11. We will continue to emphasize the necessity of Brahimi publicly laying out the way ahead to form the interim government, with as much detail as possible, before he leaves Iraq. End Comment.

BREMER



*Tomorrow Night !!
0100 - 0300 L Windows*

OPERATION STUART: YAQUBI

XD - File

(1 APR 04)



AGENDA

- **INTEL UPDATE**
- **ISR**
- **OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**
- **HVD DETENTION BATTLE DRILL**
- **CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT**
- **IO CONCEPT**
- **PAO CONCEPT**
- **THE WAY AHEAD**



OPERATION STUART: YAQUBI

FORCE:

- CJSOTF-AP
 - NSW TU (2x SEAL PLT, 3x GROM SEC)

EXECUTION

- 030100 APRIL 2004 (SATURDAY)

CJSOTF-AP REQUESTS MOVEMENT AND
EXECUTION AUTHORIZATION FROM COMCJTF7

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Update

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

- Normally at home in the evening
- No indication of PSD at residence
- Possible ID of Yaqubi on site (26 MAR)
- Reporting associated with Yacubi at 1200 today

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Approved for Release

1.4c

Page 27 redacted for the following reason:

1.4c

Approved for Release

Concept of Operation (OBJ HAMMERHEAD)

Mission: O/O, detain (b)(6)

Tasks:

- Infiltrate target area with speed and surprise.
- Detain PC alive.
- Exfiltrate with PC without being decisively engaged.
- Process PC at JSOTF Tactical Holding Facility
- Turnover PC to 1AD for arrest and imprisonment.

Task Org:

- Main Effort: NSWTU Central
- QRF: On Call Company 1.4b.1.4b.1.4d.
- MED: 2 x MH-53
- Fires and I&W: 2xHH-60, AC-130,
- I&W: Predator

Phase I: Stage Force (RPC)

LNOs to FOB Hotel 01APR04
GAF mvmt to FOB Hotel 022100C - 030001C


Phase II: Combat Operations

- IIA: Infil/RPC to Hotel to An Najaf 1.4a
- IIB: Assault (Yaqubi's House/Office) 1.4a
- IIC: Secure Target (PC, SSE Products) 1.4a
- IID: Exfil (transfer at HLZ vic Hotel) 1.4a

Phase III: Exfil Force (to RPC)

Phase IV: PC Processing (Bio/Med/Prep for Movn't) 1.4a

Phase V: PC Handover (to MPs at RPC)



ABORT CRITERIA

- 4 x HMMWVs / 2 Asslt Teams (8-men)
- PID of Sadr on target after GAF departs CJP
- Loss of ISR prior to departure CJP

SECRET/REL USA, POL



Information Operations – Yaqubi (1 OF 2)

- Assessment of IZ response:
 - Small, vocal minority, short lived, localized
 - Blip on the radar screen
- Pre-execution: OPSEC. Limited coord outside CJTF 1.4a
- Execution:
 - Concept: Small public display – matter of fact approach. Less is better to avoid undue attention
 - Themes – Rule of law & Iraqi Criminal Matter
 - ☐ Key Leader Engagements – Details follow
 - ☐ Passive in other AOs/ Graduated response – RTQ, O/O active if required
 - ☐ BPT conduct consequence management if killed or injured
 - ☐ COMCAM footage = vivid image conveying Iraqi criminal matter theme

Information Operations – Yaqubi (2 OF 2)

Leader engagement plan – Trigger is after detention and Pos ID

Political

- IGC members (thru CPA senior staff)
- MOJ – CJT [1,4a] SJAs office (notify special prosecutor)

Religious

- Ayatollah Sistani rep (thru CPA senior staff)
- Ayatollah Hussein Al-Sadr (CPA)

Security Forces

- 3 Police Chiefs

- Baghdad – 1AD
- Karbala Governorate – MND(CS)
- An-Najaf – MND(CS)
- Basrah –MND(SE)

– [(b)(6)], MOI

– [(b)(6)]

- Other key leaders (Tribal, Religious and Civic) at the discretion of MSC commanders based on situation



PAO Support – Yaqubi

COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVE

- The apprehension of Yaqubi serves to further move Iraq toward a state of political stability

TARGET AUDIENCES

- Iraqis (local)
- Regional Arab media

TACTICS

- Respond to query only after conduct of operation - continue to minimize Al Sadr and his forces

PHASE IV – CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

ISR:

- Focus on Baghdad Zone 21 and MSRs enabling concentration of Sadr supporters

IO: Leader engagement plan (Trigger is after detention and Pos ID)

MAN:

- MSCs enact Consequence Management Plans including heightened force protection
- MSCs monitor SADR LTs activities post-arrest
- 1AD prepared to control and block movement of SADR supporters in SADR City

C9:

- Coordinate emergency humanitarian action (HA) if necessary
- Re-establish routine CMO activities in the AOR as soon as practical

